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Abstract 
Idiosyncratic considerations relevant to South Africa’s economic and legal framework, as well as 
determining factors taken from the financial markets and the asset being auctioned are used to 
critically review the current auction mechanism used by the South African government to borrow 
funds publicly. A logistic regression with panel data is used in the empirical analysis. The 
dependent variable has a dichotomous outcome of uniform-price and discriminatory auction 
mechanisms. Data from 43 different countries over the period 2005 to 2011 are used for the 
analysis. It was hypothesized that countries with higher uncertainty about the price of their 
public debt, should use the auction mechanism that reduces under-pricing. Results from the logit 
regression supported this view. Upon comparing South Africa’s profile with the logit regression 
results, alongside a review of the literature, it becomes apparent that the proposed model does 
not provide a definitive answer. However, the model does aid policymakers’ decision on which 
auction mechanism should be preferred over the other for South Africa.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the different global government bond auction 
mechanisms and determine if South Africa is currently utilising the most efficient government 
bond issuance programme, given the country’s emerging-market status. This analysis will 
identify certain characteristics of the country’s economic and legal framework, and will 
determine factors from the financial markets to assess which of these characteristics will have a 
significant impact on the country’s issuance programme (i.e., fund-raising). 
 
1.2 Context of the Study 
 
There is often a shortfall between governments’ income and expenditure. They have a limited 
number of options available to them to alleviate this deficit: collect more revenue from taxpayers 
or borrow money from a public investor pool to fund it. Governments mainly access public debt 
capital markets to borrow money from investors by issuing tradable securities in the form of 
government bonds, notes, bills and other related securities (generically referred to as 
‘treasuries’).  
 
1.2.1 Brief overview 
 
The first government borrowing to finance government deficits took the form of tontines.1 
France offered the first national tontine in 1689 and England offered the last in 1789 (Weir, 
1989: 96). According to the Bank of England, the English government issued the first 
government bond in 1693 to raise funds to fight the war against France. Since then, governments 
have constantly accessed public debt capital markets to finance the shortfall between income and 
                                                            
1 Tontines are forms of life annuities in which survivors benefit from the death of other participants. In simple life 
annuity loans the government borrowed by taking lump-sum payments in exchange for providing a stream of 
repayments during the lifetime of a nominee. Tontines are also referred to as ‘consoles’. 
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expenditure. Total global public debt increased to approximately US$41.25 trillion in 2011 and 
the United States of America’s (US’) public debt is approximately 25 per cent of the global 
public debt burden (The Economist, 2012). 
 
1.2.2 Different auction mechanisms 
 
Since Friedman (1960) started the discussion surrounding which auction mechanism the US 
Treasury Department should use, academic researchers have contributed widely to the literature 
on government security auctions. The main focuses of the literature were on the use of auction 
mechanisms, primary dealers and syndications to market and distribute government securities, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of each (McConnachie, 1996).  
 
Given the global public debt figure, the vast number of different government securities and the 
prolific research output on government security auctions, one would expect that sovereign 
issuers would have determined the most efficient government debt issuance structure, auction 
style and characteristics for their securities programme. However, after reviewing research 
conducted by Back and Zender (1993), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), Malvey and Archibald 
(1998), and Goldreich (2007), it has become apparent that there is an on-going robust debate 
about sovereign issuance procedures. The key focus of the debate pertains to different auction 
pricing mechanisms and the relative merits of selling government bonds by using the uniform-
price auction or the discriminatory auction mechanism. The four main auction mechanisms as 
described by Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) are as follows:  
 
(i) Discriminatory auction 
 
Bidders submit the amount of securities they desire as well as the price that they are willing to 
pay. The bids are then ranked from high to low and the highest bid is allocated the desired 
amount. The process is repeated until the full amount of supply is allocated. Winning bidders pay 
the price that they initially submitted (Bikhchandani and Huang, 1993: 118).  
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(ii) Uniform-price auction 
 
Bidders submit the amount of securities they desire as well as the price that they are willing to 
pay. The bids are then ranked from high to low and the highest bid is allocated the desired 
amount. The process is repeated until the full amount of supply is allocated. However, unlike the 
discriminatory auction, winning bidders all pay the price of the highest losing bid even if they 
submitted a higher bid price initially (p. 118) 
 
(iii)  Ascending-price auction 
 
Bidders indicate the amount of securities they desire as well as the price that they are willing to 
pay. The auctioneer initiates the auction at a low price and increases the price until the demand 
equals the amount of supply. The bidders pay the price that equates demand and supply. This 
type of auction system is commonly used to auction works of art (p. 118).  
 
(iv) Descending-price auction 
 
The auctioneer initiates the auction at a high price and decreases the price until a bidder is 
willing to pay the current price for a certain amount of the objects on offer. The bidder pays the 
price bid for the object. This sequence is repeated until the whole supply is allocated. Tulips in 
the Netherlands are mainly auctioned in this fashion (p. 119).  
 
1.2.3 Examples of divergence between auction mechanisms implemented in  
different countries 
 
The South African government currently uses a primary dealer system to distribute its bonds and 
the uniform-price auction mechanism to determine the price that bidders will pay for their 
securities. In Brazil a primary dealer system and the uniform-price auction mechanism are used 
to issue floating-rate notes and index-linked bonds. However, the discriminatory auction 
mechanism is used to issue fixed-rate bonds (Figueiredo et al., 2002: 14). In contrast, the Federal 
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Republic of Germany distributes its bonds through the Bund Issue Auction Group and uses the 
discriminatory auction mechanism to price its securities (Bundesbank, 2012: 1). 
 
The US Treasury first adopted the discriminatory auction mechanism when it began auctioning 
Treasury bills in 1929 and it continued to use this method when coupon-bearing securities were 
issued in the 1970s (Garbade and Ingber, 2005: 1). During the 1990s, the US Treasury embarked 
on a review of its auction procedures in collaboration with the Securities Exchange Commission 
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Chari and Weber, 1992: 2). In 1992 
the US Treasury started to auction 2- and 5-year securities using the uniform-price auction 
mechanism and extended this mechanism to all maturities in 1998 (Goldreich, 2007: 6). 
 
Brenner, Galai and Sade (2009) conducted a short survey to determine which auction 
mechanisms treasuries and central banks employed around the world. The researchers received 
responses from 48 countries. Their results indicated that most of the countries that they had 
sampled used the discriminatory auction mechanism. However, the result seems to be counter-
intuitive because the largest issuer of public debt, the US, decided to change from the 
discriminatory auction mechanism to the uniform-price mechanism in 1998 (Goldreich, 2007: 6). 
This contrast between the empirical finding of Brenner et al. (2009) and the US’ decision to 
change its auction mechanism raised the suspicion that there might be certain characteristics of 
the country issuing public debt that influence the auction mechanism that should be 
implemented. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Almost all financial assets are issued by means of an auction process. To that end, a large 
amount has been written about the auction process with particular reference to the two main 
auction mechanisms: (i) the uniform-price and (ii) discriminatory auction mechanisms (Back and 
Zender (2001); Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996); Heller and Lengwiler (1998); Harris and Raviv 
(1981)). However, academics have not been able to determine the most efficient way of 
auctioning securities. It appears that the different auction mechanisms yield different revenue, 
interest payment and investor participation outcomes. The choice of auction mechanism has, in 
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turn, created a disparity between the amount of interest countries pay on their public debt, the 
amount of revenue collected from issuing debt and the composition of the investor pool. In 
summary, it seems that country-specific characteristics and the nature of the debt being issued 
could determine which auction mechanism should be implemented in pursuit of efficiency. Yet, 
research related to identifying these country-specific characteristics and nature of the debt being 
issued, which would aid the choice of auction mechanism, has not been so nuanced.  
 
1.4 The Objective and Significance of this Study 
 
This study will attempt to shed some light on the South African government’s decision to use its 
current auction mechanism and will aid policymakers in enhancing or changing the existing 
auction mechanism in order to manage the country’s public debt issuance programme. In this, 
idiosyncratic considerations relevant to the country’s economic and legal framework, as well as 
determining factors taken from the financial markets and the asset being auctioned, will be used 
to critically review the current auction mechanism implemented by the South African 
government. Thus, if the study is able to identify relevant characteristics that influence the 
auction mechanism of choice, an appropriate auction mechanism could be identified which, in 
turn, would minimise the country’s interest payment bill and maximise the revenue collected.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this section a detailed literature review of the key focus areas of the research on this topic is 
undertaken. In the first part a critical review of the debate about discriminatory and uniform-
price auction mechanisms is presented. In the second section the review focuses on determining 
explanatory variables that have been used in other macro-finance studies to articulate the 
relevant  characteristics of the country’s economic and legal framework, and on determining 
factors taken from the financial market and the asset being auctioned.  
 
2.2 The Debate About Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Auction Mechanisms 
 
As mentioned previously, there has been wide-ranging debate about uniform-price and 
discriminatory auction mechanisms. In this part of the literature review the researcher highlights 
the key findings of previous research, and contrasts and attempts to explain the different 
conclusions that have been reached.  
 
Back and Zender (1993) compared the uniform-price auction with the discriminatory auction 
mechanism, assuming that the items on auction were independent. They illustrated that single-
unit demands did not accurately describe the game theory decisions used in multiple unit treasury 
auctions. Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) observed that the average selling price for uniform-
price auctions was higher than discriminatory auctions but the assumption that bidders only 
wanted one unit of the indivisible good was used. Back and Zender (1993) determined that 
bidders who bought more than one unit of a good were more concerned with the marginal cost of 
the good than the price. The steep demand curve submitted by bidders in a uniform-price auction 
increased the marginal cost of other bidders and thus decreased competition (this finding did not 
change if the number of bidders was increased) and a type of collusion occurred. The authors 
determined that there was collusion when a uniform-price auction was utilised. The collusion 
that transpired reduced the amount of revenue collected when compared to the revenue raised 
under the discriminatory auction mechanism.  
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Table 2.1 presents a summary of the pertinent works on the dominant auction mechanisms, 
which are discussed systematically. 
  
Table 2.1: Summary of the empirical findings of research that has been conducted on different 
countries’ Treasury securities markets  
Author 
Country/ 
Market 
Period 
reviewed Auction mechanism Result/Findings 
Umlauf (1993) Mexican 
Treasury bill 
1986–1991 Discriminatory: 
1986–July 1990 
Uniform-price: 
July 1990–1991 
Uniform-price raises more revenue. 
Bidder profits increase as information 
dispersion increases. 
Gordy (1999) Portuguese 
Treasuries 
June 1998– 
April 1993 
Discriminatory Positive correlation between number of 
bids, price dispersion of bids and market 
volatility. Bidder profits increase as 
quality of public information 
deteriorates.  
Heller and 
Lengwiler 
(1998) 
Swiss Treasury 3-year period Uniform-price Switching to a discriminatory auction 
mechanism would increase the 
government’s debt finance costs by 
0.2 per cent.  
Nyborg et al. 
(2002) 
Swedish 
Treasuries 
1990–1994 Discriminatory As volatility of prices increases, bid 
dispersion increases, prices are reduced 
and quantities of goods bid for are 
reduced. 
Chari and 
Weber (1992) 
US Treasuries N/a N/a The uniform-price auction mechanism 
would yield more revenue, since bidders 
would have less incentive to gather 
costly information or shade their bids 
when the uniform-price mechanism is 
employed. 
Harris and 
Raviv (1981) 
N/a N/a N/a When bidders are risk-averse, the 
discriminatory auction mechanism is 
superior in terms of expected revenue for 
the seller, when compared to the 
uniform-price mechanism. 
Malvey and 
Archibald 
(1998) 
US Treasuries January 1990– 
July 1998 
Discriminatory: 
January 1990– 
August 1992 
Uniform-price: 
September 1992– 
July 1998 
The auction spread is smaller under the 
uniform-price mechanism. Thus, the 
revenue collected by the US Treasury 
would be greater when the uniform-price 
mechanism is used. 
Nyborg and 
Sundaresan 
(1996) 
US Treasuries July 1992–August 
1993 
91 discriminatory price 
auctions and 15 
uniform-price auctions 
The choice of auction mechanism 
impacts on when-issued market 
volumes, volatility and the magnitude of 
mark-ups. 
Goldreich 
(2007) 
US Treasuries June 1991–
December 2000 
Both auction 
mechanisms were used 
during the period under 
review 
Switching to the uniform-price 
mechanism would reduce the amount of 
under-pricing but not eliminate it. 
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Umlauf (1993) studied Mexican Treasury bill auctions during 1986 to 1991 and focused on the 
bidding behaviour of investors. The Mexican Treasury started implementing the uniform-pricing 
mechanism in July 1990; previously it had used the discriminatory mechanism. During the 
sample period, it had completed 237 auctions but the final sample size of the analysis was 
207 auctions. The author determined that uniform-price auctions raised more revenue than 
discriminatory auctions but could not determine whether the uniform-price mechanism alleviated 
the problem of collusion between bidders or if it alleviated the fear of the winner’s curse.2 
Umlauf’s findings suggest the existence of information asymmetries between large and small 
bidders, and that bidder profits increase as information dispersion increases.  
 
Back and Zender (2001) conducted a study on uniform-price auctions where the seller may 
cancel part of the amount of securities on offer. This study appears to resolve the contradictory 
findings between Back and Zender (1993) and Umlauf (1993). Back and Zender (2001) 
determined that when using the uniform-price mechanism, there were certain benefits to 
increasing the number of bidders when the auction had supply restrictions. Therefore, the 
differences in the findings of previous studies may be attributed to the Mexican Treasury’s 
ability to limit the supply of securities on offer.  
 
Gordy (1999) analysed 510 Portuguese Treasury auctions. The discriminatory auction 
mechanism was used and bidders could submit multiple bids during the study period. Gordy’s 
period covered June 1988 to April 1993. The results showed that when there was a greater 
probability of a winner’s curse, bidders would increase the number of bids and disperse prices 
more widely. It can thus be inferred that there is a positive correlation between the number of 
bids submitted, dispersion of bid prices and the measures of market volatility. Their results are 
consistent with Umlauf’s (1993) findings which suggested that bidder profits would increase as 
the quality of public information deteriorated.  
 
 
                                                            
2 The bidder submitting the highest bid will win the auction and receive the goods. However, it could occur that the 
winning bidder has overestimated the true value of the goods of auction and thus has overpaid.  
9 
 
Nyborg et al. (2002) analysed the bidding behaviour of over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions 
(multi-unit security auctions that were priced using the discriminatory auction mechanism) 
between 1990 and 1994. They found that the dispersion of bids swelled as volatility of prices 
(uncertainty) increased. These results are in line with the findings of Gordy (1999). Nyborg et 
al. (2002) also found that bidders reduced the price levels that they bid and quantity of securities 
demanded as uncertainty increased. The authors found that for bidders, auction size was a less 
important factor than price uncertainty. As auction sizes were increased, bidders would increase 
their demand by less than one to one, the price levels remained relatively unchanged and the 
dispersion of bids appeared to be affected marginally.  
 
Heller and Lengwiler (1998) analysed over a three-year period whether switching from the 
uniform-price to the discriminatory auction mechanism would increase the Swiss Treasury’s 
revenue. The Swiss Treasury only used the uniform-price auctions mechanism during the period 
analysed. Given this constraint, the authors had to transform the bids received in the auctions to 
hypothetical bid functions that would have occurred under the discriminatory auction 
mechanism. They determined that if the Swiss Treasury used the discriminatory auction 
mechanism, it would have increased the government’s debt finance costs by 0.2 per cent. In 
addition to this, they also found that uniform-price auctions were strategically simpler for 
bidders, since bidders would reveal their true demand schedules and did not have to utilise other 
resources to determine other bidders’ behaviour.  
 
Chari and Weber (1992) reviewed the US Treasury auction mechanism by focusing on the 
information acquisition process, which is a key difference between the discriminatory and 
uniform-price mechanisms. During a discriminatory auction, all bidders pay the amount they bid 
and this leads to more bid shading than during a uniform-price auction where all winning bidders 
will pay the same price. Given that all bidders pay the same price for the goods, bidders would 
have less incentive to gather costly information or shade their bids. Chari and Weber therefore 
determined that the uniform-price auction mechanism would yield more revenue. The authors 
also argued that switching to a uniform-price mechanism would decrease the size of the when-
issued Treasury market and the forward market, because price discovery (information 
acquisition) would be less important if every bidder paid the same price. 
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Harris and Raviv (1981) attempted to determine the most efficient auction mechanism, based on 
the way bidders adapted their bids for each auction mechanism, from the seller’s point of view. 
During a uniform-price auction, bidders indicate their true reservation price, while during a 
discriminatory auction, bidders shade their bids to below their true reservation price. The model 
for the authors’ analysis was based on the assumption that a fixed quantity of divisible goods was 
sold to N potential bidders who bid for one unit. Harris and Raviv (1981) found that when 
bidders were risk-neutral, uniform-price and discriminatory auction mechanisms were both 
optimal mechanisms and maximised the seller’s revenue. However, their results indicated that 
when bidders were risk-averse, the discriminatory auction mechanism was superior in terms of 
expected revenue for the seller compared to the uniform-price mechanism. 
 
Malvey and Archibald (1998) updated the major results found in the US Treasury’s 1995 study 
entitled “Uniform-price Auctions: Evaluation of the Treasury Experience” (US Treasury, 1995). 
They used two different datasets: one for the analysis of the concentration of awards for different 
groups: discriminatory auction for January 1990 to August 1992, and uniform-price auction for 
September 1992 to July 1998; and another to measure the effects of auction techniques on 
revenues: discriminatory auction for June 1991 to August 1992, and uniform-price auction for 
September 1992 to September 1995. They determined the effect of the different auction 
mechanisms on the revenue collected by comparing the auction bid yields with the yields in the 
when-issued market. The authors used the auction spread (auction yields minus when-issued 
yields) to determine which auction mechanism yielded the greater revenue for the US Treasury. 
They found that the auction spread was smaller under the uniform-price mechanism. Thus, the 
revenue collected by the US Treasury would be greater when the uniform-price mechanism was 
used.  
 
Furthermore, Malvey and Archibald (1998) examined whether the auction results from the two 
different mechanisms were significantly different from the when-issued yield. Under the 
discriminatory auction mechanism the results indicated that the auction spreads where 
statistically different from zero for the 2- and 5-year notes. The results were in contrast to the 
results obtained under the uniform-price mechanism. Under the uniform-price mechanism, the 
results indicated that the auction spreads were not statistically different from zero for the 2- and 
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5-year notes. These results suggest that the US Treasury’s expected revenue was reduced under 
the discriminatory auction mechanism. When the dataset was updated to May 1998, the results 
remained consistent with the previous findings. 
 
Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) analysed US Treasury auctions during July 1992 and 
August 1993 for 91 discriminatory price auctions and 15 uniform-price auctions. The authors 
provide evidence that the choice between auction mechanisms impacts on when-issued market 
volumes, volatility and the magnitude of mark-ups, and the average difference between the 
auction yield and the when-issued security yield 30 minutes before the start of the auction 
bidding process. Nyborg and Sundaresan’s (1996) contribution differs from previous studies 
because their dataset contains all the transactions executed by Garban Securities LLC, one of the 
most active US Treasury security brokers. They concluded that when-issued security trading was 
more active under the uniform-price mechanism and had lower post-auction volatility than under 
the discriminatory price auction.  
 
In addition, Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) performed direct tests on the difference in mean 
mark-ups for the two different auction mechanisms. However, the tests yielded inconclusive 
results. Analyses of the 2-year auctions revealed that uniform-price auction had a lower mean 
mark-up around 1:00 p.m. than the discriminatory auction. This result was reversed around the 
time the auction outcome was released. Analyses of the 5-year auctions revealed that the mean 
mark-up was lower in a uniform-price auction around the release time but the same results were 
not obtained around the 1:00 p.m. period. Nyborg and Sundaresan’s (1996) results differ from 
the finding of Malvey and Archibald (1998) which used a longer analysis period. 
 
Goldreich (2007) analysed the amount of under-pricing3 for uniform-price and discriminatory 
auction mechanisms. The author also attempted to demonstrate the effect that the auction 
mechanism had on the revenue raised, assessing whether there was little bidder power or 
strategic behaviour. The dataset used consisted of announced results for 283 Treasury security 
auctions between June 1991 and December 2000, and the secondary market prices at the time of 
                                                            
3 The amount by which the mean winning yield of the auction exceeds the when-issued or secondary market yield is 
defined as the amount of under-pricing. 
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the individual auctions. The author established that the average under-pricing for discriminatory 
auctions was 0.59 basis points. This result was statistically significant and in line with previous 
results obtained by other researchers. However, when analysing the uniform-price auctions, the 
author found the average under-pricing to be 0.32 basis points and the result were also 
statistically significant. The conclusion can thus be drawn that switching to the uniform-price 
mechanism would reduce the amount of under-pricing but not eliminate it. 
 
Goldreich’s theoretical model is one where bidders have little market power. The model 
established that when no single bidder had any market power, then only the discriminatory 
auction mechanism exhibited under-pricing in equilibrium. However, the author found that when 
there were a finite number of bidders, both auction mechanisms experienced under-pricing. The 
author found that the average amount of under-pricing observed in the auctions was indeed 
similar to the amounts predicted by his model. 
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2.3 Economic, Legal and Financial Market Characteristics that Might Influence the 
Auction Mechanism Decision of a Country 
 
The purpose of this section is to identify variables that have been used in other macro-finance 
studies to articulate the relevant characteristics of a country’s economic and legal framework, as 
well as to determine auction-pertinent factors from the financial market and the relevant asset 
being auctioned.  
 
Consistent with the research question posed in this study, there is merit in borrowing ideas from 
other asset markets in order to establish whether there are certain interactions within those 
markets that might impact on the choice of auction mechanism. To that end, the researcher 
analyses literature that is relatively unrelated to the government securities market. However, the 
literature reviewed does establish certain links between financial market development and certain 
determining characteristics of the country that subsumes the public debt market. It is anticipated 
that the relationships pointed out by the literature under review might offer explanations that can 
be used to determine the auction mechanism that would manage the country’s public debt 
issuance programme efficiently.  
 
Brenner et al. (2009) conducted a cross-sectional multinomial logit and discriminatory analysis 
to establish which variables affected the choice of auction mechanism of a number of countries. 
The analysis indicated that countries that used the discriminatory mechanism had lower stock 
market capitalisation-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios; the legal system implemented in 
countries that used discriminatory and uniform-price mechanisms differed significantly and the 
ease-of-doing-business index was higher in countries that used a uniform-price mechanism. The 
main finding in the multinomial logit and discriminatory analysis was that the stock market 
capitalisation-to-GDP ratio correlated positively and significantly with the choice of a uniform-
price mechanism. The dummy variable for civil law versus common law correlated significantly 
with the auction pricing mechanism but when the dummy variable for civil law versus common 
law and the stock market capitalisation-to-GDP ratio were used together in the regression to 
estimate the auction pricing mechanism, only the stock market capitalisation-to-GDP ratio 
remained statistically significant. 
14 
 
Brenner et al. (2009) looked at specific characteristics that might affect the choice of auction 
mechanism, using cross-section empirical analysis. They used a set of macro-variables that had 
been applied to study other macro-finance issues. They divided the potential explanatory 
variables into two groups: the first group related to specific characteristics of the asset and the 
second related to specific characteristics of the country that was issuing the debt. They found 
evidence that the UK took the riskiness and “winner’s curse” of the asset being auctioned into 
account when determining the auction mechanism (Leong (1999) in Benner et al. (2009)). Thus, 
the credit risk of the sovereign was included as a proxy for the related riskiness of the security 
being issued. They reviewed La Porta et al.’s (1997) and Levine’s (1999) research which 
indicated that legal and regulatory systems that gave priority to creditors had more efficient 
financial intermediaries. They also determined that countries in which compliance with contracts 
and laws was enforced effectively had better-functioning financial intermediaries which, in turn, 
affected economic growth through financial intermediary development. 
 
La Porta et al. (1997) indicated that the legal system of a country influenced the size and depth of 
the capital markets. They also determined that countries that used civil law had weaker investor 
protection and less developed capital markets compared to countries that implemented common 
law. Given this, it can be concluded that there is more uncertainty surrounding the cash-flow 
repayments from government debt that is issued under a civil law legal system. 
 
Brenner et al. (2009) included the stock market capitalisation-to-GDP ratio and “ease of doing 
business” as explanatory variables. This was based on research conducted by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) which utilised a different method to illustrate how financial development decreased 
external finance cost and was supportive of economic growth. The findings of Allen et al. 
(2006), who determined that the structure of the real economy might influence the financial 
system, also contributed to the inclusion of these variables. Brenner et al. (2009) discussed 
literature connecting the structure of a country’s financial market to political influences and 
determined that indexes that ranked a country’s economic freedom and corruption should be 
included.  
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Levine (2000) investigated the linkage between countries’ financial structure and economic 
growth by analysing the competing views of bank-based and market-based financial structures. 
He determined that there was no significant link between the financial structure of a country and 
the country’s economic growth. Rather, his results pointed more in the direction of the financial 
services, as well as the legal and finance views. These views posit that financial structure was not 
the most efficient way to differentiate between financial systems. The results concluded that 
financial structure did not facilitate growth but financial systems had an important impact on 
growth. Levine’s 2000 study is also consistent with his earlier work (Levine, 1999) and with 
research conducted by La Porta et al. (1997), which all found that the choice of legal system 
influenced financial development and thus impacted on growth.  
 
Interesting research has been conducted on the cost of private firms going public. Ritter (1987) 
focused on two costs: (i) direct costs (investment banking fees) and (ii) indirect costs (under-
pricing). This analysis focused on two forms of underwriting: (i) firm commitment and best 
effort, and (ii) the costs of both methods.4 According to Ritter (1987: 276), “Rock’s (1986) 
model of under pricing of initial public offers, developed in Beatty and Ritter (1986), determines 
that firm commitment offers will be under-priced more, the greater the ex ante uncertainty about 
an issuing firm’s value.” The reason for the difference in under-pricing can be attributed to the 
asymmetric information between informed and uninformed investors. This leads to a situation 
where informed investors submit more bids for under-priced offers and uninformed investors 
will receive an unbalanced amount of overpriced offers. This leads to a “winner’s curse” 
scenario for uninformed investors.  
 
Ritter’s (1987) findings support the previous view that firms with higher ex ante uncertainty 
about their initial public offering price are more likely to use best effort as the preferred form of 
underwriting. Ritter’s findings can be linked to previous studies on auction mechanisms. As 
mentioned previously, Goldreich (2007) measured the amount of under-pricing of Treasury 
                                                            
4 During a firm commitment underwriting, the underwriter undertakes all the risk of selling the securities on offer. 
However, when best effort underwriting is used, the underwriter undertakes to sell the securities on offer but any 
unsold securities are returned to the firm issuing them. 
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securities as the difference between the auction yield and the yield of the security in the when-
issued market. The analysis concluded that uniform-price auction mechanism reduced the 
amount of under-pricing relative to discriminatory auction mechanism. Previous scholars have 
come to the conclusion that the winner’s curse is also lower for uniform-price auction than for 
discriminatory auctions (Bikhchandani and Huang, 1993).  
 
Ojah and Pillay (2009) highlight the fact that there are certain characteristics of corporate 
borrowers that would influence the choice between the use of public and private debt. In their 
review of previous literature they found that larger and less opaque corporates would tend to be 
public borrowers; corporate stock volatility decreased the probability of utilising public debt; and 
that credit ratings influenced the way corporates financed themselves. Given these and other 
findings from the literature review, they evaluated the South African corporate debt structure and 
found that public debt borrowers were bigger, were more profitable, had a longer operating 
history and were less opaque with the information they shared.  
 
Inoue (1999) stressed the importance of liquidity in the government securities market. He notes 
that the degree of liquidity is partly affected by the country’s market structure and that further 
research should be done to determine the link between structural features of markets from a 
liquidity perspective. He uses two methods to measure market liquidity: (i) turnover ratios and 
(ii) bid-offer spreads.5 The results he obtained were based on responses from a questionnaire that 
11 governments completed and other liquidity-related data collected at the end of 1997. The 
turnover ratios of the countries in the study differed from 3 to 34 times. Given this wide 
dispersion of the turnover ratios, it can be inferred that there should be a link between liquidity of 
government securities and the specific market structure of that country. 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 The turnover ratio is equal to the yearly trading volume of debt securities divided by the volume of debt 
outstanding. The bid-offer spreads is defined as the difference between the price or yield that securities are bought 
and sold at.  
 
17 
 
2.4 Summary of Guides Obtained from the Literature 
 
The purpose of this section is to present the proposed explanatory variables that will be used to 
represent identifiable characteristics that are theoretically and/or intuitively considered relevant 
in determining the appropriate auction mechanism for a country.  
 
2.4.1 Sovereign credit rating 
 
Brenner et al. (2009) found evidence that the United Kingdom (UK) took riskiness of the asset 
being auctioned into account when determining the auction mechanism. Ojah and Pillay (2009) 
found evidence that the credit rating of a corporate borrower in the South African financial 
market influenced the way they financed themselves.  
 
This study thus proposes to use the sovereign credit rating to determine the appropriate auction 
mechanism of a country. 
 
2.4.2 Total outstanding debt as a percentage of a country’s GDP 
 
Brenner et al. (2009) introduced the World Bank’s indebtedness classification of a country as a 
proxy for riskiness and uncertainty. This classification consists of a three-point scale: 1 severely 
indebted (S), 2 moderately (M) indebted and 3 less indebted (L). This study concurs with the 
intuition behind the original inclusion of this variable. Countries with higher debt-to-GDP ratios 
should be classified as riskier than countries with lower debt-to-GDP ratios because of the 
burden of repayment that accompanies the higher amount of debt. However, a narrower 
classification of indebtedness would better describe the riskiness and uncertainty of the asset 
under review.  
 
This study thus proposes the inclusion of the variable, total outstanding debt as a ratio of a 
country’s GDP. 
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2.4.3 Civil law versus common law 
 
Research conducted by La Porta et al. (1997) and Levine (1999) indicated that if a country’s 
legal and regulatory system gave priority to creditors and enforced compliance with contracts 
and laws effectively, it would have better-functioning financial intermediaries which, in turn, 
would affect economic growth through financial intermediary development. La Porta et 
al. (1997) indicated that the legal system of a country influenced the size and depth of the capital 
markets. They also determined that countries that used civil law had weaker investor protection 
and less developed capital markets. Government debt issued under a civil law legal system 
would thus have more uncertainty surrounding cash-flow repayments.  
 
It is therefore proposed that a variable be included to illustrate the legal system implemented in 
the country under review. 
 
2.4.4 Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP and GDP 
 
Brenner et al. (2009) included the variable stock market capitalisation-to-GDP ratio based on 
research conducted by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Rajan utilised a different method to illustrate 
how financial development decreased external finance cost and was supportive of economic 
growth. Ojah and Pillay (2009) determined during their review of previous literature that the size 
of the corporate borrower influenced the way that corporates financed themselves.  
 
To this end, the variables stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP and GDP will be 
included in this study. 
 
2.4.5 Country’s historical stock market volatility 
  
Gordy (1999) inferred that there was a positive correlation between the number of bids submitted 
during an auction and the measures of market volatility, and Nyborg et al. (2002) found that the 
dispersion of bids increased as the volatility of prices increased. These findings are comparable 
with Ritter’s (1987) findings that firms with higher ex ante uncertainty about their initial public 
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offering price were more likely to use best effort as the preferred form of underwriting. These 
results were all consistent with Ojah and Pillay’s (2009) findings that corporate stock volatility 
decreased the probability of utilising public debt.  
 
This study believes that there is a relationship between volatility/uncertainty of the asset and 
financial market of the country under review, and will thus include the country’s historical stock 
market volatility to proxy for this relationship. 
 
2.4.6 Turnover ratio 
 
Nyborg and Sundarasan (1996) provide evidence that the choice between auction mechanisms 
influences the when-issued market volumes. This is in line with the conclusion reached by 
Inoue (1999) that there is a definite link between liquidity of government securities and the 
specific market structure of the country.  
 
This study thus proposes the inclusion of the variable turnover ratio, measured as the ratio of the 
total value of shares traded during a year, divided by the average stock market capitalisation 
during the year. It should be noted that the ratio of the yearly trading volume of public debt 
divided by the country’s volume of outstanding debt would be a better liquidity measure of the 
country’s government securities market. However, the data needed to calculate the variable are 
not freely available. Developing nations typically have better developed stock markets when 
compared to their government securities market. Thus, a country’s stock market turnover ratio 
should be an appropriate alternative to indicate the liquidity of that country’s financial market.  
 
20 
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology  
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
The research methodology implemented in this study is based on the research conducted by 
Brenner et al. (2009). These authors analysed auction mechanisms used by national treasuries 
and central banks from around the world. Given the responses from 48 countries (based on a 
questionnaire), and certain characteristics of the countries and assets under review, Brenner et al. 
were able to present the descriptive statistics of the countries according to the auction mechanism 
implemented by each. However, they did not include South Africa’s preferred auction 
mechanism in their study. Owing to the importance of the South African financial market in the 
African context, the non-inclusion of South Africa is unarguably an important omission.  
 
This study therefore focuses on the South African context and attempts to update the descriptive 
statistics by adding additional specific characteristics. Some of the previous characteristics 
utilised by Brenner et al. (2009), which are now not considered relevant due to South Africa’s 
market environment and/or absence of data, will be excluded or replaced.  
 
While conducting their univariate analysis, Brenner et al. (2009) proposed several explanatory 
variables to explain a country’s choice of auction mechanism. Following the extent of the 
literature review (as set out in Chapter 2), it is deemed wise to add and replace some of the 
characteristics identified by Brenner et al. (2009) in this study, particularly in the light of South 
Africa’s and other emerging markets’ “specialness”. This study proposes to conduct a statistical 
investigation similar to that of Brenner et al. Explanations for the dissimilarities and similarities 
between explanatory variables utilised are contained in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Comparison of the proposed explanatory variables, with the explanatory variables 
utilised by Brenner et al. (2009) 
Brenner et al. (2009) This study 
1. Sovereign debt ratings: Proxy of the 
riskiness of the asset being issued. 
 
1. Sovereign credit rating: Ojah and Pillay (2009) determined during 
their review of previous literature that the corporate credit rating 
influenced the way corporates financed themselves. Hence, this study 
envisages that the link between corporate credit ratings and the way 
they finance themselves may exist in the government securities market. 
2. Indebtedness classification: The World 
Bank classifies countries by their level 
of indebtedness. A three-point scale is 
used: 1 severely indebted (S), 2 
moderately indebted (M) and 3 less 
indebted (L). Proxy for riskiness and 
uncertainty.  
 
2.  Total outstanding public debt as a percentage of a country’s GDP: 
Given the very broad three-point scale used by the World Bank, the 
researcher believes that a narrower classification of indebtedness would 
be able to better describe the level of uncertainty/riskiness of the asset 
under review. This study will thus replace the World Bank’s 
indebtedness classification with total outstanding public debt as a ratio 
of the country’s GDP. This measure is more likely to produce more 
cross-variation of the time-series than the World Bank’s measure. 
3. Civil law versus common law: This 
variable was included after research by 
La Porta et al. (1997) indicated that legal 
systems that protected creditors and 
enforced contracts stimulated financial 
intermediary development and, in turn, 
affected economic growth. 
3.  Civil law versus common law: La Porta et al. (1997) indicated that the 
legal system of a country influenced the size and depth of the capital 
markets. They also determined that countries that used civil law had 
weaker investor protection and less developed capital markets, and 
would thus have more uncertainty surrounding the cash-flow 
repayments from government debt that was issued under a civil law 
legal system.  
4. Stock market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP: Proxy for degree of 
financial market development. 
 
4.  Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP: Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) determined how financial development decreased 
external finance cost and was supportive of economic growth. In this 
study this variable is proposed as a proxy for the degree of financial 
market development (size and breadth). 
 
5. GDP: Proxy for the size of the country’s 
economy. 
 
5. GDP: Ojah and Pillay (2009) determined during their review of 
previous literature that the size of the corporate borrower influenced 
the way that corporates financed themselves. In this study this variable 
is proposed as a proxy for the size of the country’s economy (measured 
in USD billion) 
6. The ease of doing business index and 
the CPI corruption index: Proxy to 
rank the countries according to 
competitiveness, economic freedom and 
corruption.  
6. Country’s historical stock market volatility: Ritter (1987) determined 
that the ex ante uncertainty of an initial public offering price affected 
the method of underwriting. Ojah and Pillay (2009) also established 
that higher corporate stock volatility decreased the probability of 
utilising public debt. Given these findings, the researcher in this study 
includes the country’s historical stock market volatility as a proxy of 
uncertainty and the amount of information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors. 
 7. Turnover ratio: Inoue (1999) noted that the degree of liquidity in the 
government securities market was partly affected by the country’s 
market structure. The researcher in this study will thus include a ratio 
of the total value of shares traded during a year, divided by the average 
stock market capitalisation during the year of the country under review. 
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The other relevant contribution from Brenner et al. (2009) that motivated this study is their cross-
sectional multinomial logit and discriminant analysis to determine potential country-specific 
factors that could impact on the choice of auction mechanism implemented by countries. 
However, in this study a logistic regression (where the dependent variable has a binary outcome) 
is implemented, instead of a multinomial logit regression for the statistical analysis. Given that 
this study is proposing to determine idiosyncratic considerations relevant to South Africa’s 
economic, legal and financial market framework to guide the choice of an auction mechanism, 
the researcher proposes that the dependent variables should only be classified into two groups: 
(i) uniform-price and (ii) discriminatory auction mechanisms.  
 
Another consideration for the choice of regression was based on the research conducted by 
Engle (2001), where he determines that financial data follows a non-normal distribution 
(heteroscedastic errors). Gujarati (2006) establishes that the Linear Probability Model (LPM) is 
not the best model to use when the dependent variable has a binary outcome because of the 
heteroscedastic error term of a binary distribution. Gujarati proposes the use of a logit model to 
alleviate this problem.  
 
This study’s proposed logit regression is represented as follows: 
 
The explanatory variables in the proposed regression model are described in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Explanatory variables of the proposed regression model 
i  i =1  if the country uses a uniform-price mechanism 
i =0 if the country uses a discriminatory mechanism 
0   Intercept 
icreditrateD ,1  D1, creditratei = 1 if the country’s sovereign rating is investment grade (i.e., BBB-and above) D1, creditratei =0 if the country’s sovereign rating is non-investment grade (i.e., BB+ and below) 
GDP
debtX  Total outstanding public debt as a percentage of the country’s GDP 
iLaw
D ,2  D2,Lawi = 1 if the country practices civil law  
D2,Lawi = 0 if the Country practices common law 
GDP
capX  Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP 
GDPX  GDP in USD billion 
HVX  Country’s historical stock market volatility 
TRX  Turnover ratio: total value of shares traded during a year divided by the average stock 
market capitalisation during the year 
ti,  Error term 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
Brenner et al. (2009) conducted a survey targeted at central banks and treasuries around the 
world that attempted to determine the auction practices of the countries involved. The authors 
received responses from 48 countries. Of the countries that responded, 50 per cent used the 
discriminatory auction mechanism, 19 per cent used the uniform-price mechanism, 19 per cent 
used both mechanisms and the rest used different auction mechanisms from the ones mentioned.  
In contrast, this study analysed the auction mechanisms of 43 countries.  It should be noted that 
the sample of countries analysed in these two studies are not the same but they are very similar. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the disparities between the sample countries of these two studies. The main 
justification for the differences between samples is that the data from some of the smaller 
countries may be unreliable and in some cases unavailable and thus a decision was taken to 
exclude them. The absence of African countries and the lack of representation of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC) nations were also addressed in this study’s sample. Brenner et al. (2009) 
used cross-sectional data during their analysis, whereas this study uses panel data, with a time-
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series from 2005 to 2011 (Annexure A contains samples of a few countries’ datasets used in the 
econometric analysis of this study). 
 
Table 3.3:  Disparities between the sample countries utilised in this study and the countries 
utilised by Brenner et al. (2009) 
Countries included in the sample of this study 
but not in Brenner et al. (2009) 
Countries included in Brenner et al.’s (2009) 
sample but not in this study 
Chile Bangladesh 
Czech Republic Cambodia 
Egypt Ecuador 
India Fiji 
Indonesia Korea 
Nigeria Luxembourg 
Russia Macedonia 
South Africa Mongolia 
Spain Panama 
 Republic of Cyprus 
 Sierra Leon  
 Slovenia 
 Solomon Islands 
 Venezuela 
Given that this study proposes to determine a model that will aid the choice of auction 
mechanism that countries should implement (taking into account idiosyncratic considerations 
relevant to their economic, legal and financial market framework), the dependent variables are 
classified into two groups: (i) uniform-price and (ii) discriminatory auction mechanisms; these 
are the two prototypical mechanisms. To that end, countries that utilise both mechanisms will be 
classified according to the auction mechanism that is used to issue the majority of the 
outstanding public debt.6 Given these considerations, 60.5 per cent of the countries in the sample 
use the discriminatory mechanism and 39.5 per cent use the uniform-price mechanism. In the 
remainder of this section the data collection methodology, calculation, description of the 
explanatory variables (Table 3.4) and a summary of the basic descriptive analysis (Table 3.5) are 
presented. 
                                                            
6 Brazil uses both auction mechanisms but the bulk of the outstanding public debt was issued with the uniform-price 
mechanism. Similar to Brazil, the UK uses both auction mechanisms but the majority of its outstanding public debt 
was issued with the discriminatory mechanism.  The Czech Republic only utilises the uniform-pricing mechanism 
when issuing Treasury bills and Italy only utilises the discriminatory mechanism when issuing Treasury bills.  
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Table 3.4:  Data collection methodology, calculation and description of the explanatory variables  
Explanatory variable Description 
Sovereign credit rating Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term foreign debt rating (Bloomberg Professional Services, 2012).
Total outstanding public 
debt as a percentage of the 
country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment(s) of interest and/or principal by the 
debtor to the creditor at a date(s) in the future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs), currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and 
standardised guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable (International Monetary Fund, 2011). 
Civil law versus common 
law 
This is a description of a country’s legal system (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).7  
Stock market capitalisation 
as a percentage of GDP 
Market capitalisation (also known as ‘market value’) is the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the 
country’s stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies do not include investment 
companies, mutual funds or other collective investment vehicles (The World Bank, 2012).  
GDP GDP at current prices, in USD billion (International Monetary Fund, 2011) 
Country’s historical stock 
market volatility 
Bloomberg Professional Services (2012) uses the close-to-close method to calculate historical 
volatility, using a 220-day rolling volatility to calculate the historical volatility.   
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This is the standard estimator for the square of the volatility parameter, for a time-series. It is an 
unbiased estimator of geometric Brownian motions, with constant volatility and constant drift. CtC 
σ is the annualised standard deviation of the log returns (Annexure B contains all the indices and 
the index calculation methodology used to calculate the stock market volatility). 
Turnover ratio Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period, divided by the average market 
capitalisation for the period. Average market capitalisation is calculated as the average of the end-
of-period values for the current period and the previous period (The World Bank, 2012)  
 
                                                            
7 Malta has a mixed legal system comprising English common law and civil law; Nigeria has a mixed legal system 
comprising English common law, Islamic law (in 12 northern states) and traditional law; Norway has a mixed legal 
system of civil, common, and customary law; and South Africa has a mixed legal system comprising Roman-Dutch 
civil law, English common law and customary law. However, this study determined that common law formed the 
basis of the aforementioned countries’ legal systems thus, for the sake of simplicity, all these countries’ legal system 
will be classified as common law. 
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Table 3.5: Summary of the basic descriptive analysis of the proposed explanatory variables 
Full dataset GDP8 (USD billion) Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Market 
capitalisation 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
Historical 
volatility Turnover ratio 
Mean: 1055.16 59.82 73.80 23.00 71.06
Min: 6.01 4.10 4.78 4.02 0.66
Max: 15064.82 233.01 309.92 75.69 348.58
STDEV: 2243.15 37.49 58.36 10.41 57.50
  Percentage 
investment grade 
 Percentage below 
investment grade 
 Percentage 
civil law 
 Percentage 
common law 
  
S&P longterm 
Foreign debt 
rating 
 78.07%  23.93%       
Legal 
system 
     62.79%  37.21%   
Sources: Bloomberg Professional Services (2012); International Monetary Fund (2011); Central Intelligence 
Agency (2012); The World Bank (2012)  
 
3.3 Methodology of Empirical Analysis 
 
This study will utilise a logistic regression with panel data, which is different from the 
multinomial logit regression with cross-sectional data implemented by Brenner et al. (2009). 
This section highlights certain characteristics of the analytical model and dataset implemented in 
this study by providing a brief explanation of both. 
 
The logit model is based on the logistic (cumulative) distribution function and uses a regression 
to obtain a p-value that can be used to compute the predicted probability of a dichotomous 
outcome. An LPM can also be used to estimate a model with a binary dependent variable. 
However, the major weakness of the LPM model is that it assumes a linear relationship between 
the explanatory variables and the probability of the dependent variable and there is no guarantee 
that the estimated value of the dependent variable will be bounded between 0 and 1. The logit 
model remedies the defects of the LPM and does not assume a linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables and the p-value ranges between 0 and 1 (Gujarati, 2006).  
 
                                                            
8 GDP is measured at current prices as mentioned in Table 3.4. 
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Panel or longitudinal data comprise cross-sectional units measured over multiple periods. This 
allows analysis to be conducted over a period instead of just at a certain point in time. 
Brooks (2008) illustrates that panel data can be used to analyse increasingly multifaceted 
problems and a wider range of issues than time-series or cross-sectional data respectively. The 
combination of time-series and cross-sectional data could mitigate the problem of 
multicollinearity and by structuring the model in a certain way it does alleviate the impact of 
omitted variable bias. The panel data approach particularly incorporates the dynamics of the 
relevant study variables when estimating test statistics.  
 
To that end, it is deemed appropriate to use panel data in the logistic regression for the empirical 
part of this research. Given the complexity of the research question at hand, limited data 
availability and the related economic relevance, it is prudent to use this methodology due to its 
remedial effects in dealing with some of the shortcomings of other methods.  
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This empirical analysis of this study is carried out using data on 43 different countries over the 
period 2005 to 2011. The focus of the study is to determine idiosyncratic considerations that 
guide the country’s Treasury department’s choice of an auction mechanism. It is proposed that 
the dependent variable be a dichotomous variable reflecting uniform-price and discriminatory 
auction mechanisms. It was deemed necessary to do a basic descriptive analysis on the proposed 
explanatory variables. The data are analysed by grouping the different countries according to the 
auction mechanism predominantly implemented when issuing government debt. The reason for 
this is to determine if there are any disparities between the descriptive statistics of the proposed 
explanatory variables.  
 
Summaries of the basic descriptive analysis of the different countries, when grouped by which 
auction mechanism they deployed in issuing government debt, are presented in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 (17 countries use the uniform-price auction mechanism and 23 countries use the 
discriminatory auction mechanism). By comparing the descriptive statistics, it becomes apparent 
that a larger portion of countries that implement the discriminatory auction mechanism are rated 
investment grade, have a civil law system and have higher debt-to-GDP ratios than those 
utilising the uniform-price mechanism. However, GDP and stock market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP are substantially higher for countries that implement a uniform-price 
mechanism. All the other explanatory variables are relatively similar between the two auction 
types. 
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Table 4.1:  Summary of the basic descriptive analysis of the proposed explanatory variables  
of countries that utilise the uniform-price auction mechanism when issuing 
government debt 
Full dataset: 
Uniform auction 
mechanism GDP (USD billion) Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Market 
capitalisation as 
a percentage 
of GDP 
Historical 
volatility 
Turnover 
ratio 
Mean: 1 305.94 50.50 90.53 23.74 69.38
Min: 15.98 4.10 9.58 4.02 1.17
Max: 15 064.82 121.07 309.91 75.69 348.58
STDEV: 3241.70 29.89 75.78 11.11 64.28
  Percentage 
investment grade 
 Percentage below 
investment grade 
 Percentage civil 
law 
 Percentage 
common law 
  
S&P longterm 
Foreign debt 
rating 
 63.02%  26.98%       
Legal 
system 
     58.88%  41.12%   
Sources: Bloomberg Professional Services (2012); International Monetary Fund (2011); Central Intelligence 
Agency (2012); The World Bank (2012)  
 
Table 4.2: Summary of the basic descriptive analysis of the proposed explanatory variables of 
countries that utilise the discriminatory auction mechanism when issuing government debt 
Full dataset: 
Discriminatory 
auction 
mechanism GDP (USD billion) Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Market 
capitalisation as 
a percentage 
of GDP 
Historical 
volatility 
Turnover 
ratio 
Mean: 891.19 65.91 62.78 22.55 72.16
Min: 6.01 7.76 4.78 6.50 0.66
Max: 5 855.38 233.01 155.24 54.45 269.82
STDEV: 1 191.88 40.64 39.85 9.95 52.72
  Percentage 
investment grade 
 Percentage below 
investment grade 
 Percentage civil 
law 
 Percentage 
common law 
  
S&P longterm 
Foreign debt 
rating 
 87.91%  12.09%       
Legal 
system 
     65.38%  34.62%   
Sources:  Bloomberg Professional Services (2012); International Monetary Fund (2011); Central 
Intelligence Agency (2012); The World Bank (2012)  
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Given the sizeable differences observed between the minimum and maximum as well as standard 
deviation of some of the explanatory variables for both groups, an approach of grouping the 
countries by a different classification has been encouraged.  The World Bank classifies countries 
into three different income groups. The countries relevant to this study are labelled as (i) low-, 
(ii) middle- and (iii) high-income countries, according to the World Bank’s classifications and 
are illustrated in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: World Bank Country Classification of the countries in the dataset 
Country Classification Country Classification 
Ghana Low Australia High 
India Low Austria High 
Nigeria Low Belgium High 
Argentina Middle Canada High 
Brazil Middle Finland High 
Chile Middle France High 
Colombia Middle Germany High 
Czech Republic Middle Greece High 
Egypt Middle Ireland High 
Hungary Middle Israel High 
Indonesia Middle Italy High 
Jamaica Middle Japan High 
Latvia Middle Malta High 
Lithuania Middle New Zealand High 
Mauritius Middle Norway High 
Mexico Middle Portugal High 
Poland Middle Singapore High 
Russia Middle Spain High 
South Africa Middle Sweden High 
Trinidad and Tobago Middle Switzerland High 
Turkey Middle United States of America High 
    United Kingdom High 
Source:  OECD (2012)  
 
This study considers it functional to analyse low- and middle-income countries together and 
high-income countries separately. Upon comparing the descriptive statistics, it becomes apparent 
that high-income countries have larger GDPs, higher debt-to-GDP ratios, higher stock market 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP and a higher stock market turnover ratio than the low- and 
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middle-income group. It should also be noted that 98.7 per cent of high-income countries are 
rated investment grade and only 56.46 per cent of the low- and middle-income group are rated 
investment grade. The divergences of legal systems are much larger for the low- and middle-
income group and the vast majority of countries in this group use the civil law system 
(Tables 4.4 and 4.5).   
 
Table 4.4:  Summary of the basic descriptive analysis of low- and middle-income countries 
in the dataset 
World Bank 
Country 
Classification: 
Low- and middle-
income countries GDP (USD billion) Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Market 
capitalisation as 
a percentage 
of GDP 
Historical 
volatility 
Turnover 
ratio 
Mean: 409.20 45.67 57.46 23.62 40.01
Min: 6.49 4.10 4.78 4.02 1.14
Max: 2 517.93 143.36 291.28 75.69 162.70
STDEV: 503.16 29.71 54.72 10.76 39.05
  Percentage 
investment grade 
 Percentage below 
investment grade 
 Percentage civil 
law 
 Percentage 
common law 
  
S&P longterm 
Foreign debt 
rating 
 56.46%  43.54%       
Legal 
system 
     71.42%  28.58%   
Sources:  Bloomberg Professional Services (2012); International Monetary Fund (2011); Central Intelligence 
Agency (2012); The World Bank (2012)  
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Table 4.5:  Summary of the basic descriptive analysis of high-income countries in the dataset 
World Bank 
Country 
Classification: 
High-income 
countries GDP (USD billion) Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Market 
capitalisation as 
a percentage 
of GDP 
Historical 
volatility 
Turnover 
ratio 
Mean: 1 671.75 73.32 89.10 22.43 100.49
Min: 6.01 9.63 13.47 7.54 65.67
Max: 15 064.82 233.10 309.92 54.45 348.58
STDEV: 2 973.38 39.91 57.84 10.07 56.77
  Percentage 
investment grade 
 Percentage below 
investment grade 
 Percentage civil 
law 
 Percentage 
common law 
  
S&P longterm 
Foreign debt 
rating 
 98.70%  1.30%       
Legal 
system 
     54.45%  45.46%   
Sources:  Bloomberg Professional Services (2012); International Monetary Fund (2011); Central 
Intelligence Agency (2012); The World Bank (2012)  
 
On analysing the descriptive statistics of the countries that implement uniform-price or the 
discriminatory auction mechanism, and grouping all the countries in the dataset by the World 
Bank Country Classification, it becomes apparent that it will be useful to determine three 
different logistic regressions, as described in the next paragraph. This would assist with 
determining the most appropriate auction mechanism for the country under review, in this case 
South Africa, when issuing government debt.   
 
Firstly, a model would be determined for all 43 countries in the dataset (full dataset), and 
thereafter the 43 countries would be divided into two different groups, according to the World 
Bank Country Classification: (i) a low- and middle-income countries group, and (ii) a high-
income countries group. Subsequent models would be determined for these individual groups. 
The divergences of the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for the different groups 
are potentially indicative of the fact that the explanatory variables might have unique effects on 
each of the groups. 
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4.2 Logit Regression Results and Analysis 
 
4.2.1   Model specification  
Logit regression equation for the full dataset9:  
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Logit regression equation for low- and middle-income countries: 
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Logit regression equation for high-income countries: 
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All variable input is as follows (see Table 3.2): 
i  i =1  if the country uses a uniform-price mechanism 
i =0 if the country uses a discriminatory mechanism 
0   Intercept 
icreditrateD ,1  D1, creditratei = 1 if the country’s sovereign rating is investment grade (i.e., BBB-and above) D1, creditratei =0 if the country’s sovereign rating is non-investment grade (i.e., BB+ and below) 
GDP
debtX  Total outstanding public debt as a percentage of the country’s GDP 
iLaw
D ,2  D2,Lawi = 1 if the country practices civil law  
D2,Lawi = 0 if the Country practices common law 
GDP
capX  Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP 
GDPX  GDP in USD billion 
HVX  Country’s historical stock market volatility 
TRX  Turnover ratio: total value of shares traded during a year divided by the average stock 
market capitalisation during the year 
ti,  Error term 
 
                                                            
9 The logit regression results of all three datasets can be found in Table 4.6 
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4.2.2 Model evaluation  
 
(i) Full dataset 
 
Results from the estimation of the model, using the full dataset, indicate that the likelihood ratio 
chi-square test statistic (LR chi-squared) is 84.15110 (see Table 4.6). The LR chi-squared test 
examines the null hypothesis, namely that at least one of the explanatory variables in the model 
is important in influencing the choice of auction mechanism. Prob>chi2 indicates the probability 
of obtaining the chi-square statistic, if the explanatory variables have no effect on the dependent 
variable. Upon comparing the p-value of the regression with the critical value of 1 per cent, it 
can be determined that the model is statistically significant and at least one of the regression 
coefficients is not equal to zero. The predicted model is statistically significant at the 99 per cent 
confidence interval. The pseudo R-squared for the model is 0.257.11 
 
(ii) Low- and middle-income countries 
 
The LR chi-squared test statistic, for the low- and middle-income countries, is 92.419 and the 
Prob>chi-squared is 0.000. The predicted model is statistically significant at the 99 per cent 
confidence interval. The pseudo R-squared for the model is 0.57. 
 
(iii) High-income countries 
 
The LR chi-squared test statistic, for high income countries, is 31.633 and the Prob>chi-squared 
is 0.000. The predicted model is statistically significant at the 99 per cent confidence interval. 
The pseudo R-squared for the model is 0.2062. 
                                                            
10 LR chi-squared figure is calculated by multiplying the difference between the log likelihood of the intercept-only 
model and the log likelihood of the current model by negative two.  
11 The pseudo R-squared should not be confused with the R-squared that is found in ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. It does not measure the proportion of variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the 
variances in the explanatory variables. Unlike the R-squared that is found in OLS regression, the pseudo R-squared 
indicates the value gained from adding new variables to a model.  
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4.2.3 Interpretation of the regression findings  
 
In this section the statistically significant explanatory variables of all three logit regressions are 
discussed and interpreted. As stated previously, a decision has been made to limit the dependent 
variable, namely the auction mechanism, to a binary outcome. If the dependent variable equals 1, 
then the country under review would be utilising the uniform-price auction mechanism, and all 
the bidders concerned in the auction would pay the same price for the security even if their initial 
bid were higher. To that end, if the dependent variable equalled 0, then the country under review 
would be utilising the discriminatory auction mechanism and winning bidders would be allocated 
securities at the price they initially bid for. 
 
During the statistical analysis, several statistically significant explanatory variables were 
determined. However, some of the explanatory variables did not have significant effects as was 
expected, and one of the variables recorded a contrary sign on the dependent variable when the 
full dataset was classified into the sub-groups.  
 
The literature review revealed findings by Ritter (1987) that supported the views that firms with 
higher ex ante uncertainty about their initial public offering price were more likely to use best 
effort as the preferred form of underwriting to alleviate the problem of under-pricing. When 
Ritter’s findings are compared with Goldreich’s (2007) study, which concluded that uniform-
price auction mechanism reduced the amount of under-pricing relative to discriminatory auction 
mechanism, it is intuitively logical to infer that countries with higher uncertainty about the price 
of their public debt should use the auction mechanism that reduces under-pricing, namely the 
uniform-price auction mechanism. 
 
The variables: sovereign credit rating, total outstanding public debt as a percentage of a 
country’s GDP and historical stock market volatility, were initially proposed to proxy the risk 
factors, uncertainty and volatility of the country issuing debt, and the characteristics of the 
country’s financial market and the asset being auctioned. It is suggested that countries with 
higher uncertainty about the price of their public debt should use the auction mechanism which 
reduces under-pricing and, therefore, it would be expected that any variable that increased 
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uncertainty, risk or volatility should increase the probability of using the uniform-price auction 
mechanism by the country under review.  
 
According to the regression results of the full dataset and the low- and middle-income group, as 
a country’s sovereign credit rating changes from below investment grade (0) to investment grade 
(1), the predicted probability that the country uses the uniform-price auction mechanism 
decreases by 54 and 86 percentage points respectively (as per the marginal effect of the 
variable12). If a country’s historical stock market volatility increases, the chances of using the 
uniform-price mechanism increase by 0.83 percentage points for the full dataset. These findings 
concur with the logic of this study. However, the regression analysis of total outstanding public 
debt as a percentage of the country’s GDP had a counter-intuitive outcome. It was proposed that 
countries with higher debt-to-GDP ratios should be classified as riskier than countries with lower 
debt-to-GDP ratios because of the burden of repayment that accompanies the higher amount of 
debt. In contrast with the study’s expectation, the regression analysis indicates that countries 
with higher debt-to-GDP ratios tend to shy away from using the uniform-price auction 
mechanism and prefer the discriminatory auction mechanism. A one-unit increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio of a country would thus decrease the probability of using the uniform-price 
mechanism by 0.38 and 1.65 percentage points for the full dataset and the low- and middle-
income group. Considering this outcome, it may be possible that countries with higher debt-to-
GDP ratios signal their ability to service debt, and thus mitigates the information asymmetry 
between the issuer and investors. 
 
The variable, turnover ratio, exhibited two different regression results when the low- and middle-
income group and the high-income group were analysed. During the analysis of the low- and 
middle-income group, it was found that when the turnover ratio increased by one unit, the 
predicted probability of the country under review using the uniform-price mechanism decreased 
by 1.19 percentage points. Given that the turnover ratio was used as a proxy to illustrate financial 
market liquidity, the regression result supports the economic suspicion that liquid markets aid 
price discovery and thus decreases uncertainty of asset prices. However, during the analysis of 
the high-income group, it was determined that as the turnover ratio increased, the predicted 
                                                            
12 Marginal effect of a variable= P(Y=1׀X)*P(Y=0׀X)*coefficient of the variable 
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probability of the country under review, using the uniform-price mechanism, increased by 
0.26 percentage points. The very small positive effect that this variable has on the high-income 
group does not concur with this study’s expectation.  
 
The variables, GDP and stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, were initially 
included in this analysis because Brenner et al. (2009) proposed that the variables were proxies 
for the degree of economic development and the size of a country’s economy. Rajan (1998) 
illustrated how financial development decreased external finance cost and was supportive of 
economic growth. Ojah and Pillay (2009) determined that the size of the corporate borrower 
influenced the way that corporates financed themselves. The regression analysis indicates that an 
increase in the stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP for all three datasets would 
increase the chances that the country would use the uniform-price mechanism to issue public 
debt by 0.45, 1.4 and 0.25 percentage points respectively. GDP is only statistically significant for 
the full-dataset and the low- and middle-income group, and indicates that as a country’s GDP 
grows, the predicted probability of implementing the uniform-price mechanism increases by 0.01 
and 0.0001 percentage points respectively. 
 
Even though the dummy variable, civil law versus common law, was not significant for any of 
the groups analysed, it is considered necessary to mention its effect. According to the regression 
result of the full dataset, if a country changes its legal system from common law (0) to civil law 
(1), the predicted probability that the country uses the uniform-price auction mechanism appears 
to be positive. This result is consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (1997) and in line with 
the expectation of this study. La Porta et al. indicated that countries using civil law had the 
weakest investor protection and less developed capital markets. These findings would indicate 
that there is more uncertainty surrounding the cash-flow repayments from government debt that 
were issued under a civil law legal system.  
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Table 4.6: Logit regression results: Dependent variable is 1 if auction mechanism is uniform-price and 0 if it is discriminatory  
Explanatory variables Full dataset Low and middle income High income 
Coefficient t-ratio Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient t-ratio Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient t-ratio Marginal  
effect 
Intercept -0.4074 -0.62   1.5379 0.92   -4.53896 -4.76***  
Sovereign credit rating -2.44432 -6.11***  -0.5445 -5.28286 -4.61***  -0.8578 (Omitted)13   
Total outstanding public debt as a 
percentage of the country’s GDP 
-0.01684 -3.56***  -0.0038 -0.06607 -5.25***  -0.0165 0.00368 0.66 0.00064 
Civil law versus common law 0.56356 1.46  0.1224 1.30632 1.06  0.3059 -0.29725 -0.52 -0.0519 
Stock market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP 
0.02024 5.43***  0.0045 0.05586 4.74***  0.0140 0.01411 3.35*** 0.0025 
GDP 0.00028 3.24***  0.0001 0.00276 3.35***  0.0007 0.000005 0.06 0.000001 
Country’s historical stock market 
volatility 
0.03687 2.26**  0.0083 0.04861 1.45  0.0122 0.015992 0.66 0.0028 
Turnover ratio -0.00445 -1.02  -0.0010 -0.04752 -4.15***  -0.0119 0.01525 2.1** 0.0026 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
Model information: 
Number of observations 248     117     130     
Log likelihood -121.992     -34.85     -60.8864     
Log likelihood chi-square ( LR chi2) 84.151     92.419     31.633     
Prob>chi-squared 0.000     0.000     0.000     
Pseudo R-squared 0.257     0.57     0.2062     
                                                            
13 The results of the variable are omitted because there was no cross-variation during the analysis. 
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4.3 Limitations and Observations of the Empirical Analysis  
 
The first limitation of this study is the limited number of observations available. The analysis 
only includes data from 43 different countries over a period of seven years. This problem was 
amplified when the dataset was divided into low- and middle-income, and high-income groups. 
The second is that some of the countries in the study use multiple auction mechanism and have 
multifaceted legal systems; given the choice of regression analysis the countries’ auction 
mechanism and legal system had to be reclassified to suit the relevant model. The final limitation 
is the inadequate guide (the literature) on logit regression analysis when using panel data and the 
relevant statistical test that should be performed. 
 
During the analysis, sizeable differences were observed between the minimum and maximum, 
the large standard deviation of some of the explanatory variables, and the presence of outliers in 
the study. To address these issues, some of the variables were transformed (e.g., logging the 
data) and the outliers were omitted. However, these actions did not have a material effect on the 
explanatory power of the coefficients. During the period reviewed, no country changed its 
auction mechanism. In the past, several countries changed their auction mechanism in order to 
issue debt. However, the availability of this data is extremely limited and credibility of some of 
the data sources can be questioned, limiting the study period under review.  
 
4.4 Critical Review of South Africa’s Auction Mechanism 
 
This study set out to evaluate South Africa’s current auction mechanism and aid policymakers in 
enhancing or changing the current mechanism in order to manage the policy around public debt 
in the most efficient way. In order to evaluate the auction mechanism, South Africa’s unique 
characteristics will be scrutinised by comparing them to the logit regression results and certain 
findings that emerged during the literature review.  
 
It was previously deemed intuitively correct to infer that countries with higher uncertainty about 
the price of their public debt should use that auction mechanism which reduces under-pricing, 
namely uniform-price mechanism. Results from the logit regressions supported this view.  
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South Africa can be described as a middle-income emerging-market economy with well-
functioning financial markets. South Africa currently uses the uniform-price mechanism when 
issuing its public debt and has an investment grade credit rating. According to results from the 
logit regression, the investment grade credit rating would decrease the probability of South 
Africa using the uniform-price auction mechanism. However, the variable sovereign credit rating 
had a binary outcome, resulting in a classification that was too broad, which could give a 
misrepresentation of the actual risk involved by investing in government debt. The regression 
analysis showed that as a country’s total outstanding public debt as a percentage of GDP 
increased, the probability of using the uniform-price mechanism decreased. This result has been 
attributed to the impact that this ratio could have on mitigation of information asymmetries 
between investors and issuers. This impact would, in turn, affect price discovery and uncertainty 
pertaining to the country’s public debt. South Africa’s total outstanding public debt as a 
percentage of GDP is far below the mean of the countries in this study. Because of this, the 
probability of using the uniform-price mechanism increases.  
 
South Africa has a mixed legal system comprising civil, common and customary law. It has been 
determined that common law formed the basis of the legal system. Research conducted by La 
Porta et al. (1997) indicated that there was more uncertainty surrounding the cash-flow 
repayments from government debt that were issued under a civil law legal system. The 
regression results indicated that if a country changed its legal system from common law (0) to 
civil law (1), the predicted probability that the country used the uniform-price auction 
mechanism increased. According to these findings, the probability of South Africa using the 
uniform-price mechanism should decrease. However, this result was not statistically significant 
per the regression analysis. 
 
South Africa’s stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP is larger than the mean of the 
countries in the survey but its GDP is far lower than the mean GDP of the countries in the 
survey. The regression results for the variables stock market capitalisation as a percentage of 
GDP and GDP, indicate that a one-unit increase in either variable will increase the country’s 
probability of using the uniform-price mechanism when issuing public debt. However, the 
interpretation of the results is not straightforward because the presence of outliers in the dataset 
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can distort the mean of these variables. This provides a weak guide for the South African 
situation.  
 
Gordy (1999) inferred that there was a positive correlation between the number of bids submitted 
during an auction and the measures of market volatility, and Nyborg et al. (2002) found that the 
dispersion of bids increased as the volatility of prices increased. These results are consistent with 
Ojah and Pillay’s (2009) findings that corporate stock volatility decreased the probability of 
utilising public debt. These findings are all consistent with the idea that an increase in volatility 
subsequently increases the uncertainty of the true value of a security. The results from the 
regression used in this study correspond with this idea and suggest that an increase in the 
country’s historical stock market volatility would increase the probability that the country would 
use the uniform-price mechanism. South Africa’s historical stock market volatility is comparable 
with the mean of the sample countries. Thus, the historical stock market volatility is not 
excessively high but definitely something that needs to be considered when choosing an auction 
mechanism.  
 
Nyborg and Sundarasan (1996) provide evidence that the choice between auction mechanisms 
influences the when-issued market volumes. This is in line with Inoue’s (1999) conclusion that 
there is a definite link between liquidity of government securities and the specific market 
structure of the country. The regression results also indicate that there is a link between the 
liquidity of a country’s financial market, proxied by turnover ratio, and the auction mechanism 
the country uses to issue debt. South Africa’s turnover ratio is much lower than the average 
turnover ratio of the full dataset but it is marginally higher than the mean of the low- and middle-
income group. Hence, it can be concluded that South Africa’s financial markets are less liquid 
when compared to all the countries in the dataset but provide above-average liquidity when 
compared to the low- and middle-income group. When South Africa’s turnover ratio is compared 
with the full dataset, it can be inferred that the probability of using the uniform-price auction 
mechanism increases.  
 
Upon comparing South Africa’s profile with the logit regression results, combined with the 
literature review conducted, it becomes apparent that the proposed model does not provide a 
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definitive answer. However, the model does aid policymakers’ decision on which auction 
mechanism should be preferred over the other for South Africa. The model has identified several 
variables that make economic sense and form key considerations when choosing the appropriate 
auction mechanism that a country should implement. South Africa’s overall characteristics 
display signs of uncertainty, volatility, lack of liquidity and a suggestion of high credit risk. 
Thus, on balance, the most efficient auction mechanism is the current uniform-price auction 
mechanism.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
This study set out to evaluate the different government bond auction mechanisms and determine 
whether or not South Africa is currently utilising the most efficient government bond issuance 
programme, given the country’s characteristics. The literature review conducted was unable to 
identify the most efficient auction mechanism definitively. In several instances the literature 
review presented conflicting results pertaining to the different auction mechanisms. The choice 
of auction mechanism created a disparity between the amount of interest countries paid on their 
public debt, the amount of revenue collected from issuing debt and the composition of the 
investor pool. 
  
Owing to these conflicting results, it was determined that an analysis should be conducted to 
identify pertinent characteristics of South Africa’s economic and legal framework, and to 
determine factors from the financial markets. This would aid with the assessment of these 
characteristics and determine which of them would have a significant impact on the country’s 
issuance programme. Several characteristics from other macro-finance studies were identified. 
They represented the risk related to investing in the country, the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the 
country’s legal system, the size of the country’s economy, financial market development, and the 
liquidity and volatility of the country’s financial market.  
 
The logistic regression, using panel data, was able to identify the impact that these characteristics 
would have on a country’s choice of auction mechanism. Many of the characteristics identified 
concurred with this study’s proposed effects and with research conducted on initial public 
offerings of stocks. The literature review revealed findings by Ritter (1987) that supported 
previous views that firms with higher ex ante uncertainty about their initial public offerings were 
more likely to use best effort as the preferred form of underwriting to alleviate the problem of 
under-pricing. When Ritter’s findings are compared to Goldreich’s (2007) study, it is logical to 
infer that countries with higher uncertainty should use the auction mechanism that reduced 
under-pricing (i.e., uniform-price mechanism). The characteristics utilised in the regression that 
represented uncertainty (i.e., risk, volatility and liquidity) all indicated that as uncertainty 
increased, a country’s probability of using the uniform-price mechanism also increased.  
44 
 
However, the model was unable to determine, definitively, which was the most efficient auction 
mechanism to implement in South Africa when issuing public debt. The model does aid 
policymakers’ decision on which auction mechanism the country should implement. South 
Africa’s overall characteristics display signs of uncertainty, volatility, lack of liquidity and a 
suggestion of high credit risk. Thus, on a balance of probability, the current auction mechanism, 
namely the uniform-price auction mechanism, appears to be more efficient than the 
discriminatory auction mechanism. However, South Africa’s recent inclusion in the Citigroup’s 
World Government Bond Index should address some of the nuisance of uncertainty and liquidity. 
Given the considerations mentioned previously, the ever-evolving nature of financial markets 
and the rapid change in the world’s economic architecture, it becomes pertinent for countries to 
evaluate their auction mechanism of choice on an ongoing basis.  
 
Given the encouraging results obtained from this study, it is proposed that further research be 
nuanced to identify more idiosyncratic considerations to guide the choice of auction mechanism.  
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Annexures 
Annexure A: Sample of the Dataset Used in the Econometric Analysis  
of this Study 
Country 
Type of 
auction 
Sovereign 
debt rating 
GDP 
(USD 
billion)
Debt-
to-GDP 
ratio
Civil 
versus 
common 
law
Market 
capitalisation 
to 
GDP HVOL 
Turnover 
ratio
Argentina                 
2005 U B- 183.00 87.13 Civil  33.56  26.11 30.44 
2006 U B+ 214.03 76.46 Civil  37.25  23.33 6.42 
2007 U B+ 262.09 67.10 Civil  33.24  23.77 9.92 
2008 U B- 328.13 58.52 Civil  16.01  47.60 19.31 
2009 U B 310.35 58.70 Civil  15.93  35.17 5.39 
2010 U B 369.99 49.10 Civil  17.33  25.44 4.58 
2011 U B 435.18 43.35 Civil    31.94 4.80 
Australia               
2005 D AAA 737.20 10.85 Common  115.52  10.48 77.97 
2006 D AAA 784.46 9.92 Common  146.25  13.82 86.98 
2007 D AAA 953.66 9.63 Common  151.54  18.17 110.50 
2008 D AAA 1,061.04 11.71 Common  65.00  34.27 103.11 
2009 D AAA 988.58 16.92 Common  136.07  20.28 78.78 
2010 D AAA 1,237.36 20.52 Common  128.50  15.98 90.08 
2011 D AAA 1,507.40 22.82 Common    20.94 94.00 
Austria              
2005 D AAA 303.45 64.63 Civil  41.06  14.15 43.56 
2006 D AAA 322.64 62.81 Civil  59.35  21.99 50.41 
2007 D AAA 372.83 60.67 Civil  61.43  21.59 57.82 
2008 D AAA 416.62 63.75 Civil  17.44  50.69 69.45 
2009 D AAA 382.07 69.63 Civil  14.06  35.80 40.57 
2010 D AAA 377.38 72.15 Civil  17.99  24.56 79.36 
2011 D AAA 425.09 72.33 Civil    31.04 51.60 
Belgium             
2005 D AA+  377.77 92.13 Civil  76.61 9.38 44.76 
2006 D AA+  399.98 88.14 Civil  99.27  14.34 48.46 
2007 D AA+  459.25 84.19 Civil  84.24  17.57 65.35 
2008 D AA+  506.72 89.60 Civil  33.13  38.83 76.48 
2009 D AA+  472.10 96.20 
Civil  
55.49  23.34 59.60 
2010 D AA+  467.78 96.67 Civil  57.62  19.80 42.00 
2011 D AA  529.05 94.56 Civil     25.93 43.00 
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Country 
Type of 
auction 
Sovereign 
debt rating 
GDP 
(USD 
billion) 
Debt-
to-GDP 
ratio 
Civil 
versus 
common 
law 
Market 
capitalisation 
to 
GDP HVOL 
Turnover 
ratio 
Brazil               
2005 U BB-  890.05 69.15 Civil  53.80  25.29 38.32 
2006 U BB  1,093.49 66.66 Civil  65.30  24.76 42.93 
2007 U BB+  1,378.19 65.18 Civil  100.32  28.42 56.21 
2008 U BBB- 1,655.09 63.55 Civil  35.66  54.45 74.27 
2009 U BBB- 1,600.84 68.06 Civil  73.21  29.62 73.91 
2010 U BBB- 2,090.31 66.84 Civil  74.03  20.15 66.43 
2011 U BBB  2,517.93 64.98 Civil    25.99 69.30 
Canada             
2005 D AAA 1,133.76 71.61 Common  130.62  25.29 63.57 
2006 D AAA 1,278.61 70.26 Common  133.01  24.76 81.11 
2007 D AAA 1,424.07 66.52 Common  153.54  28.42 84.66 
2008 D AAA 1,502.68 71.11 Common  66.85   54.45 111.05 
2009 D AAA 1,337.58 83.30 Common  125.81  29.62 92.40 
2010 D AAA 1,577.04 83.95 Common  137.24  20.15 71.11 
2011 D AAA 1,758.68 84.12 Common     19.52 74.80 
Chile               
2005 U A 118.29 7.28 Civil  115.39  11.89 14.89 
2006 U A 146.79 5.26 Civil  118.93  12.22 18.49 
2007 U A+ 164.25 4.10 Civil  129.57  20.45 22.96 
2008 U A+ 170.61 5.18 Civil  77.56  28.30 21.17 
2009 U A+ 161.08 6.23 Civil  130.22  16.47 21.97 
2010 U A+  203.30 9.19 Civil  167.90  11.69 19.71 
2011 U A+ 243.05 10.49 Civil     23.16 18.60 
Colombia             
2005 U BB 146.59 38.54 Civil  31.40  21.65 17.86 
2006 U BB 160.69 36.78 Civil  34.52  40.89 22.15 
2007 U BB+ 210.57 32.69 Civil  49.16  18.76 13.07 
2008 U BB+ 235.72 30.82 Civil  35.57  30.25 13.21 
2009 U BB+ 234.18 35.82 Civil  56.52  15.85 11.75 
2010 U BB+ 289.43 36.01 Civil  72.35  15.74 13.44 
2011 U BBB  321.46 35.92 Civil     19.64 13.30 
Czech 
Republic 
            
2005 D A- 124.55 29.67 Civil  30.79  18.13 118.60 
2006 D A- 142.61 29.43 Civil  34.08  21.41 75.62 
2007 D A 174.22 28.96 Civil  42.14  17.81 68.73 
2008 D A 216.09 29.95 Civil  22.61  50.55 70.39 
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Country 
Type of 
auction 
Sovereign 
debt rating 
GDP 
(USD 
billion) 
Debt-
to-GDP 
ratio 
Civil 
versus 
common 
law 
Market 
capitalisation 
to 
GDP HVOL 
Turnover 
ratio 
2009 D A 190.20 35.37 Civil  27.70  31.57 40.59 
2010 D A 192.03 38.54 Civil  22.41 21.91 29.42 
2011 D AA- 220.34 41.13 Civil   23.18 38.00 
Egypt             
2005 U BB+ 89.79 112.80 Civil 88.83 27.20 42.97 
2006 U BB+ 107.38 98.83 Civil 86.97 32.54 54.82 
2007 U BB+ 130.35 87.12 Civil 106.70 17.11 45.61 
2008 U BB+ 162.44 74.66 Civil 52.74 42.97 61.85 
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Annexure B:  Index Calculation Methodology of the Indices Used to 
Calculate the Stock Market Volatility of Each Country in the 
Dataset (Source: Bloomberg PLC) 
 
Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
Argentina: The Argentina Merval 
Index 
The Argentina Merval Index, a basket-weighted index, is the 
market value of a stock portfolio, selected according to 
participation in the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, number of 
transactions and trading value. The index has a base value of 
US$0.01 as of June 30, 1986. The index is revised every 
3 months, taking into account the trading volumes over the past 6 
months. 
Australia: The S&P/ASX 200 Index The S&P/ASX 200 measures the performance of the 200 largest 
index-eligible stocks listed on the ASX by float-adjusted market 
capitalisation. Representative liquid and tradable, it is widely 
considered Australia’s pre-eminent benchmark index. The index is 
float-adjusted. The index was launched in April 2000. 
Austria: ATX Index The Austrian Traded Index is a capitalisation-weighted index of 
the most heavily traded stocks on the Vienna Stock Exchange. 
The equities use free-float adjusted shares in the index calculation. 
The index has a base level of 1 000 as of 2 January 1991. 
Belgium: BEL 20 Index 
 
The BEL 20 Index is a modified capitalisation-weighted index of 
the 20 most capitalised and liquid Belgian stocks that are traded 
on the Brussels Stock Exchange. The equities use free-float shares 
in the index calculation. The index was developed with a base 
value of 1 000 as of 1 January 1991. 
Brazil: IBOV Index 
 
The Bovespa Index is a gross total return index weighted by 
traded volume and is comprised of the most liquid stocks traded 
on the São Paulo Stock Exchange. The Bovespa Index has been 
divided 10 times by a factor of 10 since 1 January 1985: 2 
December 1985, 29 August 1988, 14 April 1989, 12 January 1990, 
28 May 1991, 21 January 1992, 26 January 1993, 27 August 1993, 
10 February 1994 and 3 March 1997.  
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
Canada: S&P/Toronto Stock 
Exchange Composite Index  
 
The S&P/Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index is a 
capitalisation-weighted index designed to measure market activity 
of stocks listed on the TSX. The index was developed with a base 
level of 1 000 as of 1975.  
Chile: IPSA Index 
 
The IPSA Index is a Total Return Index and is composed of the 40 
stocks with the highest average annual trading volume in the 
Santiago Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago). The 
index has been calculated since 1977 and is revised on a quarterly 
basis.  
Colombia: IGBC Index 
 
The IGBC Index from the Colombia Stock Exchange, also known 
as the ‘General Index’, is a liquidity-weighted index of the most 
liquid stocks traded on the Colombian Stock Exchange (Bolsa de 
Valores de Colombia). This index has been merged with Medellin 
and Occidente since 3 July 2001. 
Czech Republic: PX Index 
 
The PX Index is the official index of the Prague Stock Exchange. 
The index was calculated for the first time on 20 March 2006 
when it replaced the PX50 and PX-D indices. The index took over 
the historical values of the PX 50 Index. The PX Index is a price 
index and dividend yields are not considered in the calculation. 
The starting date was 5 April 1994 with a base of 1 000 points. 
Egypt: EGX 30 Index (CASE) 
 
The EGX 30 Index is a free-float capitalisation-weighted index of 
the 30 most highly capitalised and liquid stocks traded on the 
Egyptian Exchange. EGX 30 constituents are reviewed and 
changed twice a year (February and August). The index was 
developed with a base level of 1 000 as of 1 January 1998 and 
previously named the ‘CASE 30 Index’. 
Finland: OMX Helsinki All-Share 
Index (HEX) 
 
The OMX Helsinki All-Share Index includes all the shares listed 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The aim of the index is to reflect 
the current status and changes in the market. The HEX Index is 
broken down using the GICS Classification as of 1 July 2005. The 
index was developed with a base level of 1 000 as of 28 December 
1990. 
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
France: CAC 40 Index 
 
The CAC 40 Index is a narrow-based, modified capitalisation-
weighted index of 40 companies listed on the Paris Bourse. The 
index was developed with a base level of 1 000 as of 31 December 
1987. As of 1 December 2003 the index has become a free-float-
weighted index. 
Germany: DAX Index 
 
The German Stock Index is a total return index of 30 selected 
German blue chip stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
The equities use free-float shares in the index calculation. The 
DAX has a base value of 1 000 as of 31 December 1987. As of 18 
June 1999 only XETRA equity prices are used to calculate all 
DAX indices. 
Ghana: GSE Composite Index 
 
All ordinary shares listed on the GSE are included in the index at 
total market capitalisation, with the exception of those of listed 
companies that have shares listed on other markets. The index is a 
market capitalisation-weighted index with base value 1 000 on 31 
December 2010. 
Greece: ASE Index 
 
The Athens Stock Exchange General Index is a capitalisation-
weighted index of Greek stocks listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange. The index was developed with a base value of 100 as 
of 31December 1980. 
Hungary: Budapest Stock Exchange 
Index 
 
The Budapest Stock Exchange Index is a capitalisation-weighted 
index adjusted for free float. The index tracks the daily price-only 
performance of large, actively traded shares on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange. The shares account for 58 per cent of the 
domestic equity market capitalisation. The index has a base value 
of 1 000 points as of 2 January 1991 and is a total return index. 
India: S&P CNX Nifty Index  
 
The S&P CNX Nifty, a free-float market capitalisation index, is 
the leading index for large companies on the National Stock 
Exchange of India. It consists of 50 companies representing 
24 sectors of the economy. The base level is defined as 1 000 on 
3 November 1995. In January 2005 its level was almost 2000. 
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
Indonesia: Jakarta Composite Index 
 
The Jakarta Stock Price Index is a modified capitalisation-
weighted index of all stocks listed on the regular board of the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The index was developed with a base 
index value of 100 as of 10 August 1982. 
Ireland: Irish Overall Index 
 
The ISEQ Overall Index is a capitalisation-weighted index of all 
official list equities on the Irish Stock Exchange but excludes UK-
registered companies. The index has a base value of 1 000 as of 4 
January 1988. 
Israel: TA-100 Index 
 
The Tel Aviv 100 Index is a capitalisation-weighted index of 100 
stocks traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). The index 
was developed with a base value of 100 as of 31 December 1991. 
TA-100 is a total return index. 
Italy: FTSE MIS Index 
 
The index will consist of the 40 most liquid and capitalised stocks 
listed on the Borsa Italiana. In the FTSE MIB Index foreign shares 
will be eligible for inclusion but not secondary lines. The 
calculation and methodology will be unchanged from the S&P 
MIB Index. 
Jamaica: Jamaica Stock Exchange 
(JSE) Market Index 
Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) Market Index comprises all 
ordinary companies. 
Japan: Nikkei 225 Index 
 
The Nikkei 225 Stock Average is a price-weighted average of 225 
top-rated Japanese companies listed in the First Section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. The Nikkei Stock Average was first 
published on 16 May  1949, where the average price was ¥176.21 
with a divisor of 225.  
Latvia: OMXR Index  
 
OMX Riga (OMXR) is an all-share index consisting of all the 
shares listed on the main and secondary lists on the Riga Stock 
Exchange in Latvia with the exception of the companies where a 
single shareholder controls at least 90 per cent of the outstanding 
shares. The aim of the index is to reflect the current status and 
changes in the Riga market. Base date is 31 December 1999, with 
a value of 100. 
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
Lithuania: OMX Vilnius (OMXV) 
 
OMX Vilnius (OMXV) is a total return index which includes all 
the shares listed on the Main & Secondary lists on the Vilnius 
Stock Exchange. The aim of the index is to reflect the current 
status &changes on the Vilnius market. Base date is December 31, 
1999, with value 100. 
Malta: Malta Stock Exchange Index 
 
The Malta Stock Exchange (MSE) Index is a capitalisation-
weighted index encompassing all shares traded on the Stock 
Exchange of Malta. Index = current market value of all shares 
listed. The index was created on 27 December 1995 with a base 
value of 1 000. From 19 May 1998 the index has been calculated 
on a daily basis. 
Mauritius: SEMDEX 
 
The SEMDEX Index is a capitalisation-weighted index including 
all shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius. Index = 
current market value of all listed shares/base market value of all 
listed shares*100 (where the market value of any shares is equal 
to the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the market 
value). The base value is adjusted to reflect new listing and rights 
issues. 
Mexico: MEXBOL 
 
The Mexican IPC Index (Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones) is a 
capitalisation-weighted index of the leading stocks traded on the 
Mexican Stock Exchange. The index was developed with a base 
level of .78 as of 30 October 1978. 
New Zealand: NZX 50 Index 
 
The New Zealand Exchange Limited 50 Free Float Total Return 
Index is a modified market capitalisation-weighted index. This 
index consists of the top 50 companies by free-float-adjusted 
market capitalisations that are listed on the New Zealand 
Exchange Limited. 
Nigeria: NGSEINDX 
 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange All Share Index was formulated in 
January 1984 with a base value of 100. Only ordinary shares are 
included in the computation of the index. The index is value-
relative and is computed daily. 
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
Norway: OSEAX 
 
Oslo All-Share Index is a market capitalisation-weighted index 
that tracks the stock performance of all shares listed on the 
exchange in its respective sectors. The index is classified based on 
the new GICS system. The index is developed on the base value 
of 100 as of 29 December 1995.  
Poland: WSE WIG 20 Index 
 
The WIG 20 Index is a modified capitalisation-weighted index of 
20 Polish stocks that are listed on the main market. The index is 
the underlying instrument for futures transactions listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange.  The base value was set to 1000 as of 16 
April 1994. 
Portugal: BVLX Index 
 
The PSI Geral (General) Index is the all-share market index, 
including all the shares listed on the Main Market, with the 
exception of non-voting preferred shares. The index reproduces 
the total return of the main Portuguese market. Then index base 
value is 1 000, as of 5 January 1988. 
Russia: MICEX Index 
 
The MICEX Index is the real-time cap-weighted Russian 
composite index. It comprises the 30 most liquid stocks of the  
largest and most developed Russian companies from 10 main 
economic sectors. The MICEX Index was launched on 
22 September 1997, base value is 100. The MICEX Index is 
calculated and disseminated by the MICEX Stock Exchange;  the 
main Russian stock exchange. 
Singapore: FTSE Straits Times 
Index 
 
The revamped Straits Times Index, calculated and disseminated 
by FTSE, comprises the top 30 SGX Main Board-listed companies 
on the Singapore Exchange selected by full market capitalisation. 
The index was revamped effective 10 January 2008. 
Spain: IBEX 35 Index 
 
The IBEX 35 is the official index of the Spanish Continuous 
Market. The index is comprised of the 35 most liquid stocks 
traded on the continuous market. It is calculated, supervised and 
published by the Sociedad de Bolsas. The equities use free-float 
shares in the index calculation. The index was created with a base 
level of 3 000 as of 29 December 1989. 
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
South Africa: JALSH Index 
 
The FTSE/JSE Africa All Shares Index is a market capitalisation-
weighted index. Companies included in this index make up the top 
99 per cent of the total pre-free-float market capitalisation of all 
listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Sweden: OMX 30 Index 
 
The OMX Stockholm 30 Index is a capitalisation-weighted index 
of the 30 stocks that have the largest volume of the trading on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. The equities use free-float shares in 
the index calculation. The index was developed with a base level 
of 125 as of September 30, 1986. ** Effective on 27 April 1998 
there was a 4–1 split of the index value. 
Switzerland: Swiss Market Index 
 
The Swiss Market Index is a capitalisation-weighted index of the 
20 largest and most liquid stocks of the SPI universe. It represents 
about 85 per cent of the free-float market capitalisation of the 
Swiss equity market. The SMI was developed with a base value of 
1 500 as of 30 June 1988. 
Trinidad and Tobago: TT COMP 
Index 
 
The Trinidad and Tobago Composite Index is a market cap-
weighted index of all the First Tier Ordinary stocks traded on the 
Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange. The exchange started 
trading full time on 1 April 2008. 
Turkey: ISE National 100 Index 
 
The Istanbul Stock Exchange National 100 Index is a 
capitalisation-weighted index composed of National Market 
companies except investment trusts. The constituents of the ISE 
National 100 Index are selected on the basis of pre-determined 
criteria directed for the companies to be included in the indices. 
The base date is January 1986 and base value is 1 for the TL-
based price index. 
USA: S&P 500 Index 
 
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index is a capitalisation-weighted index 
of 500 stocks. The index is designed to measure performance of 
the broad domestic economy through changes in the aggregate 
market value of 500 stocks representing all major industries. The 
index was developed with a base level of 10 for the 1941–43 base 
period.  
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Country and index name Index description and calculation methodology 
United Kingdom: FTSE 100 Index 
 
The FTSE 100 Index is a capitalisation-weighted index of the 100 
most highly capitalised companies traded on the London Stock 
Exchange. The equities use an investibility weighting in the index 
calculation. The index was developed with a base level of 1 000 as 
of 3 January 1984.  
 
